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Biobank Economics and the “Commercialization Problem”
Andrew Turner, Clara Dallaire-Fortier, Madeleine J. Murtagh1
Abstract
The economics of biobanking are intertwined with its social and scientific aspects. In this article, we
illustrate this interrelationship and describe two problems that structure the discussion about the
economics of biobanking. First, there is a ‘sustainability problem’ about how to maintain biobanks
in the long term.  Second,  and representing a partial  response to the first  problem, there is  a
‘commercialization problem’ about how to deal with the voluntary, altruistic relationship between
biobanks and their participants, on the one hand, and the potential commercial relationships that a
biobank may form, on the other. We agree with those social scientists who have argued that the
commercialization problem is inadequate as a way to construct the multiple tensions that biobanks
must  negotiate.  Turning to alternative  accounts  of  bioeconomy, we suggest  that  contemporary
consideration of the economics of biobanking primarily in terms of participants and their bodily
tissue may reproduce the very commodification of science that these scholars critique. We suggest
that an alternative conception of the economics of biobanking, one which goes beyond the logics of
commodification, may thereby allow broader questions about the social and economic conditions
and consequences of biobanks to be posed.
1. Introduction
Biobanks are a “collection of biological material and the associated data and information stored in
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an  organized  system,  for  a  population  or  a  large  subset  of  a  population”  (OECD  2007).
Contemporary biobanks can include collections of  specific tissue,  as well  as large prospective
population-based data.  In  their  broadest  conception,  contemporary biobanks serve a  range of
clinical  and  research  purposes,  from  blood  banking  to  the  genetic  epidemiology  of  common
complex diseases. In what follows, we are concerned with issues related to prospective population-
based biobanks.  These can be understood as an attempt to create research infrastructure, and (at
least) promise to create new forms of scientific, social and economic value (Meijer, Molas-Gallart,
and Mattsson 2012).  
Bioethicists and sociologists have taken an interest in biobanking as a phenomenon and many
(mostly  ethico-legal)  scholars  have  become  active  in  the  establishment  and  governance  of
biobanks  and  the  international  collaborative  organizations  that  support  their  coordinated
development (eg. P3G2, BBMRI3, ISBER4). Biobanks must recruit participants who are expected to
provide biological  material  and other health data.  In return,  biobanks are expected to manage
these samples and data in socially, ethically and legally legitimate ways.  This raises normative
questions  about  precisely  what  counts  as  “legitimate”  and  descriptive  questions  about  how
biobanks negotiate the tensions involved in conducting research and commercial activities with
these data. Indeed, most who write about this field use very similar concepts to structure these
debates  including:  consent,  ownership,  privacy, commercialization,  trust,  and  governance  (For
example, see the systematic review: Budimir et al. 2011; or other reviews such as Tutton 2010;
Hoeyer 2008).
According to Meijer and colleagues, biobanks exist at the “interface between sample donors and
biomedical  researchers,  in  an  academic  or  pharmaceutical  setting”  (Meijer,  Molas-Gallart,  and
Mattsson 2012,  492),  where the economics  of  biobanking are  intertwined with  the social  and
scientific aspects. Biobanks are caught directly between the values and rights of the participants
and the potential commercial and scientific value of the samples and data, and, at the same time,
have to construct a business model that will ensure the long- term sustainability of the biobank. We
describe these tensions below and demonstrate how this characterization of biobanks produces a
narrowly conceived economics.
Two distinct problems, which we discuss in turn, structure the discussion of the economic aspects
of these tensions. The first is the “sustainability problem”, about how to maintain biobanks in the
2 <www.p3g.org>
3 <www.bbmri.eu>
4 <www.isber.org>
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long  term.  The  second  problem,  which  represents  a  partial  response  to  the  first,  is  the
“commercialization problem”, about how to deal with the voluntary, altruistic relationship between
participants and biobanks, on the one hand, and the potential commercial relationships that the
biobank may form, on the other. Finally, turning to alternative accounts of bioeconomy, we suggest
that contemporary consideration of the economics of biobanking primarily in terms of participants
and their bodily tissues may reproduce the very commodification of science that these scholars
critique.  Following  Birch  (2012;  and  Birch  and  Tyfield  2012),  we  suggest  that  an  alternative
conception of the economics of biobanking, one which goes beyond the logic of commodification,
may thereby allow broader questions about the social and economic conditions and consequences
of biobanks to be posed.
2. The sustainability problem
University  or  hospital  based biobanks are often characterized as  not  being financially  secure,
because they rely on mixed, short-term or per-project funding streams (Vaught, Kelly, and Hewitt
2009; Meijer, Molas-Gallart, and Mattsson 2012; Winickoff and Winickoff 2003; Diaferia, Biunno,
and DeBlasio 2011). For example, biobanks---oriented as both for- and non-profit---may be partially
supported by a variety of sources, such as: government agencies, universities, hospitals, charities,
private pharmaceutical investment, or venture capital.
High quality (and therefore scientifically useful)  biobanking facilities are costly, both in terms of
infrastructure  and  expertise  (Vaught,  Kelly,  and  Hewitt  2009;  Winickoff  and  Winickoff  2003;
Diaferia, Biunno, and DeBlasio 2011; Gottweis and Lauss 2012), but they offer minimal short-term
returns (Kozlakidis, Mant, and Cason 2012). In order to manage these costs, as McDonald et al
observe,  “increasingly  biobanks  must  operate  as  business  enterprises  as  well  as  scientific
laboratories”  (2012,  422).  Winickoff  and  Winickoff  (2003),  and  others  (Diaferia,  Biunno,  and
DeBlasio  2011),  have  therefore  noted  a  trend  for  these  smaller  university-  or  hospital-based
biobanks  to  outsource  their  collections  to  larger  private  biobanks  that  specialize  in  providing
expertise and infrastructure but are still able to take advantage of economies of scale. Indeed,
Anderlik (2003, 203) argues that for-profit commercial biobanks have “assumed a leading role” in
biobanking sample and data management. 
In addition to outsourcing collections to larger private biobanks, Meijer et al (2012) argue that there
is an “economic logic” driving biobanks to become larger, or to become more closely networked
and share data with other biobanks, thereby creating much larger “virtual” biobanks (see also: De
Souza and Greenspan 2013). Indeed, they recommend growth as a viable “development path” in
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order to allow biobanks to become more sustainable: the key advantage is that growth can turn
them  into  a  platform  for  commercially  valuable  research  (Meijer,  Molas-Gallart,  and  Mattsson
2012). This introduces at least two ethical tensions however. 
First, and to anticipate the commercialization problem which we discuss below, a commercial focus
may put the biobank at odds with the values of the participants. Second, investment in biobanking
(whatever the funding source) comes with an economic and a social opportunity cost. As Foster
and Sharp state: “investments made today in prospective cohorts and biobanks that are projected
to be used (and funded) for decades to come will have significant consequences for determining
both  the  opportunities  and  limits  of  future  research”  (2005a,  120).  As  a  consequence,  some
observers have worried about the kinds of research that infrastructural and collaboration decisions
may lock biobanks into. Foster and Sharp (2005b; 2005a) discuss the fairness of investments in
infrastructure that could either (1) maximize returns for the most people (ie. allow the most broadly
generalizable science to be conducted), or (2) maximize returns in specific populations that do not
benefit the wider populations (ie. choosing to focus on a particular population sub-group on the
basis of age, ethnicity). Of course, opportunity costs may also include government spending lost to
other  areas,  since  public  funding  invested  for  one  purpose  is  therefore  not  available  for  use
elsewhere.  For example, Mitchell and Waldby express the concern that biobanking infrastructure
has  been  positioned  in  a  way  that  caters  “in  very  direct  ways  to  the  research  needs  of  the
pharmaceutical industry” (2010, 338) rather than to public health. 
An additional way that biobanks have been described as addressing the sustainability problem,
aside from outsourcing, or growth and commercialization, is by offering research services (Vaught
et  al.  2011;  Kozlakidis,  Mant,  and  Cason  2012)  or  charging  fees  for  access  to  the  biobank's
resources (Pathmasiri  et  al.  2011).  Vaught  et  al  note that  there are a number of services that
biobanks are uniquely positioned to offer, such as: “customised processing services”, “managed
collections”, and “centre of excellence training” (2011, fig. 4). The operation of such mechanisms,
however, are context and phenomena dependent; biobanks of differing size and funding structures
will use differing sustainability mechanisms. For example, whether a private biobank is in a position
to  manage collections  from the pathology  departments  of  local  hospitals  depends  on its  own
capabilities,  as  well  as  the  regulatory  environment  within  the  healthcare  system  in  which  it
operates.
3. The commercialization problem
One way to address the sustainability problem is to leverage the potential commercial value of a
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biobank's  samples  and  data.  However,  in  social  and  ethico-legal  literature,  this  is  seen  as
presenting two problems for biobanks. First, commercializing a biobank's resources (samples and
health related information) introduces tensions in the values and aims of biobanks by threatening
to undermine both the notion of altruistic donation and the notion that biobanks serve the scientific
and public good (Waldby 2009; Nicol and Critchley 2012; Pullman et al. 2012; Gottweis, Gaskell,
and Starkbaum 2011). For example Nicol and Critchley note the impact that commercialization
might have on a participant's trust, claiming that “commercial involvement in biobanking will cause
some potential  participants  to  question  their  motivation,  because  it  will  be  seen  by  them  as
introducing a profit motive into what is otherwise a public good activity” (Nicol and Critchley 2012).
Similarly Waldby describes a public biobanking project in Singapore, where reference to notions of
citizenship  and  public  good,  given  as  justification  for  the  project,  creates  tensions  “between
populations as bioeconomic resources and as rights-bearing citizens” (2009, 268). There are few
empirical  studies of participant concerns about commercialization;  interestingly, in one of these
studies participants were not found to be concerned about commercialization per se but rather
about issues of fairness and the maintenance of human dignity (Steinsbekk et al. 2011).
At  the  heart  of  this  aspect  of  the  commercialization  problem  is  the  idea  that  biobanks  are
positioned in relation to two distinct clusters of economic and ethical rationales (see for example:
Martin,  Brown,  and  Turner  2008,  Table  1).  Public  funding  of  biobanks  suggest  notions  of
biobanking for the common good, scientific and public health benefit and values of sharing and
trust,  whereas  notions  of  profit,  private  interest,  economic  benefit  and  mistrust  cluster  around
privately  funded  biobanks  (Onisto,  Ananian,  and  Caenazzo  2011).  Precisely  how  biobanks
configure themselves is a process of sociotechnical network formation in which the intertwining of
social, ethical and economic aspects, and public and private values must be negotiated (Bunton
and Jones 2010). 
Second,  commercialization  raises  ethico-legal  issues  about  consent,  intellectual  property  and
ownership (Petrini 2012; Martin and Kaye 2000). For example,  participants may not want their
samples  to  be  used  for  commercial  research;  the  patenting  of  genes  may  lead  to  expensive
therapies and diagnostic tests, which undermine the equity of biobank's benefits; or that fear of
litigation may stifle innovation (Andrews 2005; see also: Pathmasiri et al. 2011). These issues are
illustrated by prominent legal cases, such as Greenberg v Miami Children's Hospital  Research
Institute; Moore v Regents of the University of California; and Washington University v Catalona
(see: Petrini 2012; Anderlik 2003; Tutton 2010).
It is not clear with respect to either of these cases whether the objection is to commercialization as
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such,  or  whether  the problem is  merely  one of  how to mitigate possible unjust  or  exploitative
consequences  of  a  biobank's  commercialization  strategies.  The  literature  is  equivocal  as  to
whether the response to issues raised by commercialization should be principled or pragmatic.
Petrini notes that both the EU Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with  Regard to  the Application  of  Biology  and Medicine,  and the UN Universal
Declaration  on  the  Human  Genome  and  Human  Rights  take  the  position  against
commercialization, stating that it is impermissible to commercialize or profit from human material
(Petrini 2012, 90). More pragmatically, the ethico-legal problems of commercialization have been
constructed  as  questions  about  “what  social  and  legal  norms  will  shape  and  constrain  the
commercial  activity”  (Anderlik  2003,  206;  see  also:  Martin  and  Kaye  2000).  Conley  (2012)
describes  two  broad  approaches  that  have  been  proposed  in  response  to  the  dangers  of
commercialization: (1) redefining notions of consent and refining regulation, as illustrated by shifts
to “open” or “broad” consent and ethical oversight by IRBs (Institutional Review Boards) (Greely
2007; Greely 1999; Caulfield, Upshur, and Daar 2003; Merz et al. 2002; Rothstein 2002), or (2) the
creation of innovative ethico-legal frameworks for benefit sharing, which re-imagine the relationship
between biobanks, participant and commercial activity;  examples of which include a “charitable
trust model” (Winickoff and Winickoff 2003; see also: Otten, Wyle, and Phelps 2004; Winickoff and
Winickoff 2004), a “trade secret model” (Conley et al. 2012), and a “stewardship model” (Fullerton
et al. 2010).
As a consequence, the descriptive accuracy and analytical power of a simple dichotomy between
public  and  private  interests  has  been  questioned  as  a  way  to  understand  the  dynamics  of
commercialisation (Mitchell and Waldby 2010; Onisto, Ananian, and Caenazzo 2011; Bunton and
Jones 2010), partly because of the practical difficulty of disentangling the two (Martin and Kaye
2000,  169).  Mitchell  and  Waldby  claim  instead  that  there  is  “considerable  continuity  between
national  biobanks  and  commercial  biobanks...  [and]  donor  (sic)  participation  in  biobanks
contributes  simultaneously  to  state  and  pharmaceutical  interests,  public  and  private  value.”
(Mitchell and Waldby 2010, 336). Moreover, they suggest that since participants are expected to be
available for follow-up over an extended period, participation should be thought of as a kind of
“clinical labor”, rather than a simple gift. Indeed, unlike other biotechnologies, such as cell-lines,
the samples and data in biobanks depend on the on-going work of participants for their value;
because population biobanks are oriented towards the discovery (and commercialization) of risk
factors,  which  requires  longitudinal  collection  of  the  samples  and  data.  Mitchell  and  Waldby
therefore argue that the work of participants is crucial in order for biobanks to establish the data
necessary to create therapies or tests targeted at health risks, rather than disease. 
6 of 12
Mitchell and Waldby do not attempt to solve the commercialization problem; instead, they want to
show that it is inadequate as a framework by which to illustrate the multiple tensions that biobanks
must negotiate. We agree that the commercialization problem is  inadequate but so too is the
argument that the biobanking economy is solely about commodifying participant labour or its latent
value, as is implicit in Waldby and Mitchell’s argument. Participants “labour,” as do the range of
scientists and others involved in the production of bioknowledge and its attendant, or anticipated,
value. For large population biobanking projects, which position data as central to the production of
value,  and as the “fundamental  unit  of  exchange” (Murtagh et  al.  2012,  243)  additional  (likely
multiple) forms of value and labouring arguably exist. 
4. Discussion
To be  set-up  and  maintained,  prospective  population  biobanks  require  significant  economic
resources. Once operating, they face a sustainability problem that can be addressed in multiple
ways:  commercially,  for  example,  by  offering  research  services  or  collaboration  and
commercialization agreements with private companies; through public funding, from governments
and research agencies;  or some combination of  funding streams. Insofar as commercialization
represents a (partial) solution to the sustainability problem, it may also be thought to pose its own
ethico-legal problems. Most notably, through a line of argument that pits commercial and private
interests against the public good aims and values of biobanks. As described above, many authors
have noted the descriptive and analytical problems with this line of argument, in order to argue that
commercialisation  is  may  not  necessarily  be  problematic.  Indeed  as  Pathmasiri  et  al  state,
regarding commercialization and intellectual property arrangements, “what is in the best interests
of the public in the context of publicly funded biobanks is far from obvious” (Pathmasiri et al. 2011,
322). Notwithstanding this range of views, some large publicly funded biobanks in the UK have
taken the view, undoubtedly in response to the perceived problems of commercialization, that their
samples and data will  not be used for commercial purposes. The 1958 Birth Cohort Study, for
example, includes a clause in its consent form that directly precludes use of data and samples by
commercial interests5. Other biobanks accept commercial interest in their collections but explicitly
preclude commercial  practices that would constrain shared knowledge production:  UK Biobank
“reserve[s] the right to take [legal]  action when patents are generated as a result  of  using the
Resource that hold up other research or are unreasonably restrictive in other ways”6.
Birch (2012) and Birch and Tyfield (2012) have argued that, while being attentive to objects (such
5 <www2.le.ac.uk/projects/birthcohort/1958BC-About/commercial-use-of-the-1958bc-resource>
6 <www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/faqs/what-happens-if-a-researcher-makes-a-profit-from-using-the-resource>
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genes and tissue fragments) and people (participants, donors, and researchers), existing social
scientific analyses of the economic aspects of biobanking, have given less attention to knowledge
production (Birch 2012, 184).  Birch and Tyfield put forward a strong criticism of existing social
science analysis  for  its inappropriate and vague quasi-economic concepts,  such as “biovalue.”
They  state:  “in  using  terms  such  as  value,  capital,  surplus,  and  so  on,  current  STS
conceptualisations of the bioeconomy not only misappropriate such concepts in their discussion of
capitalist relations but also misrepresent modern bioscience and biotechnology” (Birch and Tyfield
2012,  15).  More  positively,  they  argue  that  value  is  realized  by  the  application  of  knowledge
(constituted  in  intellectual  property)  derived  from biobanking  science,  not  through  “fetishizing”
biological material using concepts such as “vitality” and “biovalue.” 
Birch (2012) and Birch and Tyfield (2012) are therefore able to reframe the commercialization
problem as a “modern-day enclosures movement”  which takes publicly  funded knowledge and
locks it into “an international IP regime” (Birch 2012, 184). Thus the commercialization problem is
better  thought  of  as  the  “apparent  contradiction  between  open  cooperation  in  knowledge
production and privatized control and exploitation” (Birch 2012, 184). This suggests an alternative
framework for empirical investigation of the economics of biobanking, one focusing on how these
contradictions are navigated and resolved across contexts, and, if open cooperation is the rubric,
includes examination of how scientists' interests converge (or don’t) within this IP regime.
We agree with this shift in focus from tissues and data, to knowledge, and from treatments and
tests, to IP. First, the social scientific literature explicitly frames the output of biobanking science as
treatments and tests. This is how, for example, Mitchell and Waldby are able to construct their
notion  of  “ontologizing”  risk  within  diagnostic  tests  (Mitchell  and  Waldby  2010,  346).   On  the
contrary, we claim that public health outputs---structural or behavioural interventions, for instance---
are an equally plausible application of the knowledge derived from biobanking science. The key
point is that once we remove the conceptual focus on commodities, we open up new ways to
realize  the  value  of  knowledge  derived  from biobanks.  For  example,  this  permits  us  to  view
commercialization  as  being  aligned  with  public  health  interests,  rather  than  as  eroding  trust.
Notwithstanding this, second, there is no reason to collapse the epistemic and temporal distance
between  biobanking  projects  now  and  their  imagined  future  outputs.  The  “commercialization
problem,” however it is conceived, may fail to be a genuine problem because of the remote and
speculative nature of the outputs, commercial or otherwise, from biobanking science. Furthermore,
any recasting of the commercialization problem should reflect on the way that it reconstructs these
“sociotechnical  futures,”  for  example,  through the putative alignment  of  commercial  and public
health interests.
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We conclude by noting the scope and potential for a more sustained analysis of the economic
aspects of biobanking. The social scientific literature has moved beyond the simple opposition of
public and private interests as a way to understand the dynamics of biobank sustainability and
commercial  activity.  There  is  clearly  a  place,  however,  for  more  sophisticated  and  nuanced
understanding the of the data, knowledge and IP economies of biobanking. 
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